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Summary ;
The paper reviews Ohlin's 1933 Ekonomisk Tidskrift article on monetary
theory and his 1934 book on monetary policy, public works, subsidies,
and tariffs as measures against unemployment. Using (1) physical output
as a variable, (2) the propensity to save, (3) liquidity preference, (4)
the multiplier, and (5) the accelerator, Ohlin developed Keynesian theory
in a dynamic form as well as Keynesian policy conclusions — two years
before Keynes.
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WHAT WAS NEW IN OHLIN'S 1933-34 MACROECONOMICS?
Bans Brems*
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, I shall try to
summarize what was new in Ohlin's 1933 article [14] on the formula-
tion of monetary theory. This summary can be brief and should be,
now that the article has, at long last, been translated into English.
Second, I shall try to review Ohlin's as yet untranslated 1934 book
[15] on monetary policy, public works, subsidies, and tariffs as
measures against unemployment. My review should give an impression
of what the entire book was like but will naturally pay particular
attention to the relation between the 1933 article and the 1934 book
and to points at which the latter broke new ground. At such points
I shall, as far as possible, let Ohlin speak for himself in direct
translation.
*HANS BREMS is Professor of Economics at the University of Illinois
at Urbana- Champaign. For friendly criticism and prodding he is in-
debted to Bon Patinkin, for encouragement and comments to Paul A.
Samuelson* and for endorsement of interpretation to Bertil Ohlin 3
letter of Becember 2, 1977.

I. OHLIN'S 1933 ARTICLE
To Bertil Ohlin in 1933, physical output was a variable. Its
variations are described explicitly in the core of his
1933 article, i. e. Sees. 6 through 8. Sec. 6 deals with the
time sequence of price changes and examines the case of a sharp
reduction of the propensity to save. The result of such a re-
duction may be expanding physical output, expanding employment,
and a higher volume of saving. Sec. 7 on a process of rising
prices, too, "will assume output to expand in response to grow-
ing demand." In Sec. 8 output contracts in response to contract-
ing demand.
So far OhTin anticipated Keynes' General Theory . But he
went beyond it in two respects.
First, Ohlin never used a Keynesian static equilibrium of
physical output often illustrated by the 45°-line diagram
in which output less than equilibrium will lead to inven-
tory depletion and output greater than equilibrium to inven-
tory accumulation. Ohlin's physical output was not an equilibrating
variable in such a static equilibrium. But Ohlin did see a feedback
mechanism: His physical output responds to demand. In doing so,
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it generates new income, hence new demand. Thus, in Ohlin's
saving example in Sec. 6 referred to above, his physical
output will rise as a result of the increased consumption demand,
and there will be a feedback from physical output via income gene-
rated by it to new consumption demand. There will also be a feed-
back via induced investment. In Ohlin's own words, "the rising investment
demand of the consumers' goods industries will eventually bring
about an increase in total investment. Total saving, then, is not
reduced but, on the contrary, increased, despite the fact that con-
sumption is up. What makes this possible is expanding output."
Ohlin sees the feedback, then, but his feedback is not telescoped into
an instant static equilibrium along an output axis the way the Keynes-
ian feedback is in the 45 diagram. Ohlin's feedback takes place along
a time axis the way Wicksell's interaction between prices and income
did at parametric output in Interest and Prices [21]. The difference be-
tween Wicksell's and Ohlin's cumulative processes is that the former
was an interaction between prices and income only, the latter an inter-
action among price, physical output, and income. Like all Swedish the-
orists of his generation, Ohlin was brought up on Wicksell, hence had
a head start in dynamics and was convinced of its power. He concludes
his Sec. 6 by saying: "By now it should be sufficiently clear that
the effects of a given primary change will differ widely if the
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secondary reactions occur in one time sequence rather than another."
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of Ohlin's 1933 paper lies
in its explicit analysis of such time sequences.
Second, Keynes gave greatest emphasis on physical output and
paid less attention to prices: He came around to them in his Ch.
21 ("The Theory of Prices"), [7], 292-309, and observed that "in-
stead of constant prices in conditions of unemployment, and of
prices rising in proportion to the quantity of money in conditions
of full employment, we have in fact a condition of prices rising
gradually as employment increases." [7], 296. But the chapter
came after the party was almost over: Ch. 21 is the last of the
main body of General Theory . To Ohlin, prices did not come in as
an afterthought. From the outset his prices were always varying
in response to his demand along with his physical output. This
points to a present-day inflation-unemployment tradeoff.
In one respect Ohlin failed to go beyond Keynes. As Wicksell
and Keynes had done, Ohlin analyzed the investment-interest rela-
tionship. But that was as far as the three of them went. They
did not see Fisher's [3] distinction between a "money" rate (the
rate of interest in terms of gold) and a "real" rate (the rate of
interest in terms of wheat or of goods in general), playing a role
in monetarist writing from Turgot [19] to Mundell [11]. Keynes

knew Fisher's work but was not impressed. Ohlin never mentioned
it. Keynes had the better excuse: He paid less attention to prices
anyway. But to Ohlin, prices were always varying along with phys-
ical output.
II. OHLIN'S 1934 BOOK
On April 14, 1934, Ohlin's report to the Swedish Unemployment Committee
was submitted to the King by the secretary of the Committee, Dag
Hammarskjold. As a volume in the findings of the committee, the
report was published a few months later by the Royal Printing
House under the title Penningpolitik, offentliga arbeten, subventionev
oah tullav eom medel mot arbetsloshet (Monetary Policy, Public Works,
Subsidies, and Tariffs as Measures against Unemployment).
The book had three parts. Part I was an expansion of the 1933
article. Part II was a systematic and clear analysis of monetary
policy, public works, subsidies, and tariffs as measures to generate
an economic expansion. Part III the shortest of the three—
—
dealt with measures to cope with structural unemployment in specific
2
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industries or geographical regions.
Ch. I. Principles of Monetary Theory
The 1934 book may be viewed as an application of the 1933 article
to problems of employment policy. Ohlin himself must have viewed
it in this way, or he would not have devoted his entire 77-page
long Part I of his 176-page book to an expanded reproduction of
his 1933 article. The early methodological and terminological
parts of the article are reproduced almost verbatim in Ch. 1.
But in that chapter two things happened to what in Ohlin's
1933 article had been called "the intention to save" ( "sparvil jan" )
.
First, the equivalent term "propensity to save" ("sparbenagenhet")
was added; second the two were formally defined as follows.
The "intention to save" and "propensity to save" of
an individual or a firm are defined as their planned
savings ratio, i. e. the relation they intend to maintain
between new saving and net income. This intention to
save is a function of, among other things, expected future
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income and the level of the rate of interest. The planned
savings ratio is something entirely different from the relat-
ion in an ex-post account between, on the one hand, net new
saving, equalling new investment, and on the other hand net
national income; the latter relation could be called "a
national new investment ratio". [15], 20n.
The reason why the 1934 book offered explicit definitions of
certain terms left undefined in the 1933 article is probably that
the book was adressing a wider audience than the article was.
In accordance with Swedish constitutional practice the book was
a public document, whereas the article was meant for professional
colleagues only.
Ch. II. The Character' of Processes of Expansion and Contraction
In Ch. II the mechanisms of expansion and contraction are set out once
again, but more completely so, with more cases examined, and with
more definitional help to the reader.
Explicit definitions of the key concepts of expansion and con-
traction are offered in the opening lines of the chapter:
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In the following we shall mean by expansion a rising real
net income and by contraction the opposite. Real net income
reflects the volume of productive activity. But there is
much to be said for measuring the latter by the change in
real net income pi us the allowance for wearing down fixed
4 Rproductive equipment , i. e. "value added by manufacture, "
adjusted for price changes. For neither net real income
nor the quantity of manufacturing are index
numbers readily available. Consequently, as an aggregate
expression for the volume of productive activity it is
customary to use an index number for the volume of gross
output, as measured by the usual index numbers for the
volume of output in manufacturing, agriculture, transport-
ation etc. [15] , 24.
Having thus defined his terms "expansion" and "contraction,"
Ohlin carefully specifies his initial conditions: Expansionary
measures will be analyzed on the background of a depression in
which
Productive capacity in the majority of firms within
manufacturing, transportation, and trade is merely in-

completely utilized, e. g. output falls short of 80 to
90 per cent of what it might have been at practically
the same fixed capital equipment and at the existing
labor force in the various industries, perhaps after some
migration of labor from one to the other. [15], 25.
Thus defined and thus starting, processes of expansion and
contraction are then analyzed in much the same way they were ana-
lyzed in Sees. 6, 7, and 8 of the 1933 article removing the last
doubts that to Ohlin, physical output was a variable to be explained
and to be affected by public policy.
The remainder of Ch. II is devoted to a study of money and
capital markets similar to that offered in the 1933 article. But
the chapter offers a first glimpse of the liquidity trap to be
elaborated in Chs. Ill and IV. Ohlin asks if monetary policy,
in Its efforts to reduce the interest rate, might encounter a
floor to the latter. Ohlin finds such a floor:
Rather than buying or owning bonds which have risen to
a price considered unreasonable and expected soon to fall,
capitalists will deposit their money, even on non-interest
-bearing accounts. 115], 42.
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Ch. III. Various Types of Conditions for Expansion
The chapter opens with a seven-page survey of business-cycle theory
not found in the 1933 article. Ohlin observes that the volume
of productive activity fluctuates more for capital goods than for
consumers' goods. And he continues:
It is clear that the business cycle implies changes in the
quantity relations of the economy. ... A special quantity
relation which seems to play a major role in the character
of processes of expansion and contraction, has to do with
the rate of growth of the total productive apparatus on
the one hand and the size of it in industries producing
durable capital goods on the other. For the rate of
growth of the former to rise from 5 per cent per annum
to 10 per cent per annum, the capacity of the latter
industries must double if already fully utilized. But
durable capital goods are also produced for replacement
purposes. If average replacement amounts to 5 per cent
per annum, then the increase of the rate of growth of
the total productive apparatus mentioned above which
is not the same as that of output itself would require
a 50 per cent increase of the output of durable capital
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goods: The annual output of new durable capital goods
must rise from 10 to 15 per cent of the existing product-
ive apparatus. [15], 50-51.
Here, then, is the accelerator. Sec. 7 in the 1933 article
had described a cumulative process of expansion but had not tried
to explain why such a process should come to an end. In Chapter
III Ohlin now uses the accelerator to explain why it should:
The accelerator links investment demand to the growth of output
whereas the propensity to save links saving to the level of
output. Those are very special conditions, and output may not
satisfy them. Ohlin's intuitive reasoning about this matter on
Pages 52-53 is reminiscent of the discussion 14 years later of
a Harrod [5] unstable, knife-edge, growth path.
Ohlin did not consider the accelerator his own discovery.
On Page 51 he refers to the Frisch-Clark discussion of it in the
1931-32 Journal of Political Economy . He must have known Clark's
1917 article [1] and must have heard about the accelerator from
his teacher Cassel. But the ease with which Ohlin fits the accele-
rator into his Ch. Ill is nevertheless interesting. First it shows
once again that to Ohlin, physical output was a variable. Can any-
thing be more physical than the accelerator? Second it shows that
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Ohlin's macroeconomics was dynamic. Let physical investment, capi-
tal stock, and output be I, S, and X, respectively; let a parametric
capital coefficient be b; and our behavior relationship be S - bX.
We explain investment by differentiating that behavior relationship
with respect to time: I £ dS/dt bdX/dt. But as soon as we are
differentiating with respect to time, we are doing dynamics. Can
anything be more dynamic than the accelerator?
The remainder of Ch. Ill is an account of ways in which an ex-
pansion might be generated in an economy left to itself. An expan-
sion might, for example, be generated by improved expectations or
by a lower propensity to save. The latter case was examined in
Sec. 6 of the 1933 article, and the book repeats the examination.
Could an expansion also be generated by, say, a wage reduction
or a higher propensity to save? The article did not examine these
cases, but the book does. What they have in common, Ohlin says,
1s that both reduce consumption demand. A wage reduction reduces
consumption demand and cost alike. Consequently, if prices would
fall correspondingly, a decline in physical consumption could be
avoided and profit margins would have remained the same. If prices
did not fall correspondingly, profit margins would be up but physical
consumption would be down. In a closed economy, Ohlin concludes, a
wage reduction will hardly be capable of starting an expansion.
A higher propensity to save is even less likely to do so. It
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would reduce consumption demand without reducing cost. Physical
consumption would be down without any improvement in profit margins.
But wouldn't investment be induced by a lower rate of interest? At
this point the liquidity trap makes its second appearance. The
relevant interest rate may encounter a floor:
It is not a limited total amount of credit that keeps
the rate of interest from falling to zero; many capital-
ists hold their money as demand deposits at zero interest
rate. What is decisive for the rate of interest in this
range is the limited amount of credit that capitalists
are willing to "tie" to a specific placement such as bonds.
If the effective bond yield falls below a certain level,
that amount of credit will be reduced and fall short of
the supply of bonds, and the yield will again rise. [15], 69
Ch. IV. Monetary Policy Measures
The chapter opens with a clear but traditional analysis of the
mechanism through which central-bank discount policy affects other
rates of interest, prices, and the propensity to save. Then fol-
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lows an equally clear analysis of open-market operations and
their effects upon liquidity and lending rates of commercial
banks and savings banks. The treatment is traditional until
Ohlin discusses the effect of open-market operations upon
bond prices. Here the liquidity trap makes its third and
full appearance:
Of great importance for the efficacy of buying and selling
bonds by the central bank is the development of bond prices,
i. e. the effective long-term rate of interest. How much
the purchase of a certain amount of bonds will raise their
prices depends first and foremost on the willingness of
bondholders to sell, 1. e. their supply curve. If there
are many who believe that the declining yield will be
temporary and therefore will sell their bonds already after
an insignificant increase in bond prices, then the latter
will indeed be insignificant. If, on the other hand, bond-
holders hold on to their bonds and merely supply a small
quantity when prices are raised, then the price increase
may become significant. [15], 85.
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Like Keynes two years later, Ohlin sees a floor under the
bond rate of interest: That rate is partly determined by what
asset holders expect it to be. Ohlin's conclusion is the same
as that of Keynes: Whatever the central bank intends to do it
should do boldly and firmly, and it should declare its intention
to do it.
Ohlin does not confine himself to monetary policy in a closed
economy but carefully explores open-economy aspects of an expansion-
ary monetary policy. There will be negative effects upon the balance
of payments, both because expanding output at home will reduce the
balance of trade, and because a lower interest rate will encourage
short-term capital export. Under a gold standard the central bank
has little room for maneuver vis-a-vis such negative effects. The
best it can do is to widen the gap between the selling and buying
price of gold, thus pushing the gold points farther apart. But
under a paper standard the central bank may let prices of foreign
currencies rise. The effect upon the balance of trade will be
positive: Export will be stimulated and import discouraged. The
effect upon short-term capital movements will depend upon expect-
ations. Under a gold standard such movements are stabilizing, but
under a paper standard they may be de-stabilizing and become, as
Ohlin puts it (Page 93), "the masters rather than the servants of
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exchange policy." Only a central bank possessing ample exchange
reserves can remain in control. Such a central bank can steer
expectations by operating in the forward exchange market.
Everything taken into account, then, is monetary policy a
potent policy instrument? Ohlin sees two obstacles. The first
is the liquidity trap now making its fourth appearance (on Page
96): "There is a limit below which it is difficult to reduce
the rate of interest for long and medium-long loans." The second
obstacle Is the exchange situation: Does an ample exchange reserve
exist? If not, will the country get away with an isolated devalua-
tion or will it merely escalate the devaluation race?
A deep and widespread depression may leave monetary policy
impotent. The trick must be, Ohlin says, to avoid getting into
such a depression in the first place. That can only be done by
preventing the expansion from going too far: "That an automobile is
stuck in a ditch does not mean that keeping it on the road lies
beyond the powers of good driving." [153, 96.
Ch. V. Public Works
Ohlin examines public works as follows. Let the monetary policy
permitted by the bal ance-of-payments constraint be unable to
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stimulate private investment. Let the government undertake some
investment project say highway construction or electrification
of State railroads which does not compete with private invest-
ment. Let the project be financed in a way say central-bank
discounting of treasury bills——which does not deprive private
investment of finance.
Such public works will generate incremental income. With
two leakages, i. e., import and saving, such incremental income
will generate incremental consumption demand. The incremental
consumption demand, in turn, will generate new incremental In-
come to be spent subject to the same two leakages. The stage
is set for the dynamic multiplier.
In Its simplest possible form the dynamic multiplier would
nowadays be set out as follows. Let consumption and income be
C and Y, respectively. Let a parametric propensity to consume
be c. Let income generated at time t - 1 be spent on consump-
tion at time t: C(t) = cY(t - I). Let public works at time t
generate the direct increment dY{t) to income Y(t). Let the
public works have been going on for n_ periods. In addition to
the direct increment dY(t) at time t there will then be an in-
direct spillover of cdY(t - 1) from public works at time t - 1,
another indirect spillover of c dY(t - 2) from public works at
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time t - 2 and a last indirect spillover of c n dY(t - n)
from public works at time t - n, when they started. Let public
works have been stationary, then dY(t) dY(t - 1) = dY(t - 2)
=
...
* dY(t - n). At time t the sum of all direct as well as
spillover incremental income is
1 - c
n +
*
(1 + c + c
2
+ ... + c
n )dY{t) - — dY(t)
This is exactly what Ohlin says in a numerical example in
which c = l / 2 , dY(t) = 20 million kronor, n a 3, and the length
of the unit period is three months:
Imagine that the average "delay" among consumers the
"time lag" of consumption response is three months
and that half the income of labor, entrepreneurs, and
taxpayers buys Swedish goods, while the remainder
buys imported goods or is saved. Then an income of a_
krcnor in the first quarter will generate incomes of
a/2, a/4, and a/8 etc. in the following quarters. If
in each and every quarter of 1933 public works in Sweden
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would have directly generated 20 million kronor then the
sum total of indirect income increments in the fourth
quarter, generated by consumption responses to the public
works undertaken in the preceeding three quarters, would
be 10 + 5 + 2 1 / 2 million kronor . (P. 105).
In the fourth quarter, then, the sum of all direct as well as
spillover incremental income is 20 + 10 + 5 + 2 l /% * 37 x / 2 million
kronor which is, of course, exactly the sum of our geometric
progression for n = 3.
Like the accelerator, the multiplier was old hat in 1934.
On Page 103 Ohlin refers to Kahn's celebrated, then three-year
old, article [6]. But what Ohlin does and does not do with his
multiplier in Ch. V* says something about his method of analysis.
The reader will notice three things.
First, the reader will notice Ohlin's use of the income
-consumption lag. This makes his use unequivocally dynamic.
Second, the reader will notice Ohlin's use of a finite value of
the number of periods considered: n - 3. Ohlin never bothers
to find the limit of his geometrical progression for n approaching
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infinity. That limit would have been a multiplier of 1/(1 - c) * 2,
i. e., 20 million kronor 's worth of expenditure would have generated
40 million kronor 's worth of income! That limit would have been the
static multiplier used by Keynes [7}, 115. Why didn't Ohlin even
bother to find it? Ohlin's strong sense of realism probably told
him two things: Public works don't last forever, so n doesn't go
to infinity. Anyway the important thing is that after merely three
quarters 37 l / 2 million kronor 's worth of income has been generated.
The difference between 40 and 37*/2 was not important to Ohlin.
The third important thing about Ohlin's use of the multiplier
are his afterthoughts: The mechanical consumption-demand multiplier
is merely one part of the story. There are other important reper-
cussions. One is inventory adjustment: How soon do retailers,
wholesalers, and manufacturers replenish depleted inventory? An-
other is investment in plant and equipment: How soon does rising
demand necessitate such expansion? The answers will depend upon
expectations and confidence. Ohlin discusses such speeds of
reaction at length: His multiplier approach is thoroughly dynamic.
The remainder of Ch. V asks such questions as: Should public
works be financed by borrowing or by taxes? Tax financing would
reduce consumption and thus defeat the purpose of public works.
If financed by borrowing, should public works be financed by the
central bank or by the private capital market? Government bonds
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sold in the private capital market might depress bond prices and
thus discourage private investment. What is the cost of public
works to the economy? If the resources absorbed by them would
otherwise have been idle, the cost is zero. How can public works
be productive if they aren't profitable? If they absorbed
resources taken out of better uses they would be unproductive
or indeed counterproductive. But if the resources would otherwise
have been idle, public works are productive as soon as they produce
anything of use. Don't public works financed by borrowing mean
living now at the expense of the future? Public works do not
mean capital consumption. On the contrary future capital stock
is increased by highway construction or electrification of State
railroads, and the future will be better, not worse, off for it.
Ohlin's answers to such questions would be standard text-
book answers today, but in 1934 they were new.
Ch. VI. Subsidizing Private Production
Subsidizing private investment has effects upon output and income
very similar to those of public works. But other effects are dif-
ferent.
First, subsidies leave more room for selective private initia-
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tive: Projects closest to being profitable will be the first ones
activated by subsidies. Second, the government outlay on subsidies
is a fraction of total outlay. Consequently it matters less whether
that outlay is financed by borrowing or taxation. Third, subsidies
do not create future government assets like highways or electric
State railroads. Consequently traditional fiscal principles would
suggest tax financing.
Subsidies raise problems of their own. A subsidy favoring one
industry may jeopardize another, competitive, industry. There
is always the danger of corruption. But to a civil service with
a corruption threshold as high as the Swedish one, Ohlin dismisses
the corruption problem as an administrative one.
Ch. VII. Tariff Policy and Capital Movements
Ohlin aptly characterizes the effects of a higher tariff in terms
of his theoretical apparatus developed in Chs. V and VI. In terms
of Ch. VI a higher tariff will raise the multiplier by reducing the
import leakage. In terms of Ch. V it will ease the balance-of
-payments constraint upon monetary policy. Indeed filling the
space, now less constrained, will to some extent be automatic: As
•
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we know, every central-bank purchase of foreign exchange from
exporters will expand the money supply, and every sale to im-
porters will reduce 1t. Consequently, a tariff reducing import
more than export will expand central-bank assets and with them
the money supply. In other words, the monetary effect of a higher
tariff is much the same as that of open-market bond purchases by
the central bank.
Public works raised an important fiscal problem. Like sub-
sidies, tariff policy merely raises a minor one. Indeed, inelastic
import demand may even raise government revenue! Whether govern-
ment revenue is down or up, it will have repercussions upon out-
put and income. Such repercussions will have to be examined,
Ohlin adds.
Long-term tariff policy might be designed to be countercyclical
i. e., protectionist in depressions, free-trade in booms helping
to keep expansions from going too far.
C'H. VIII. Expansion* Structural Change t and Unemployment
Ohlin's last chapter examines measures to help specific industries
suffering from short-run problems like dumping or violent world
-market price falls or from long-run ones like lagging technology
or declining demand. The chapter is less macroeconomi c than the
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previous ones and neither introduces nor applies new theoretical
tools
.
III. RETROSPECT
The Critics of the Stockholm School
The two leading critics of the Stockholm School, Lerner [9]
and Landgren [8], shares first, the use of a static Keynesian
equilibrium as their standard of comparison, second 3 a strong
conviction of its superiority to dynamics as a practical tool
of analysis and, third, great lucidity in setting out their ar-
gument. But their native tongues differed. Ohlin's 1933 article
and 1934 book were accessible to Landgren only.
Both for that reason and because his article [91 was a review
article of translations of Lindahl's and Myrdal's work, Lerner
never mentioned Ohlin. As for Lindahl and Myrdal . the verdict was
that they had been "caught up with and overtaken by Mr. Keynes"
[9], 591. We can only guess if Lerner would have included Ohlin
in that verdict, had he known Ohlin's work. He might have liked
Ohlin's explicit use of physical output as a variable. But he
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would have liked Ohlin*s dynamics no better than he liked Lindahl
and Myrdal's on which he said,
For practical purposes, compromises and simplifications
have to be made, and when this has beer; done, it seems
to me that little if anything has been gained as com-
pared with the simplifications and compromises of equi-
librium analysis,,,, [9]. 589.
Twenty years after Lerner, the late Karl-Gustav Landgren [8]
offered his comprehensive re-appraisal of the Stockholm School.
Very briefly expressed, his verdict was that the Stockholm School
neither anticipated nor appreciated Keynes' breakthrough. But
Landgren does single out Ohlin as the shining exception. He alone
"carried out a Keynesian revolution in Swedish economics" [8],
English-language summary, 299. Such treatment might seem grati-
fying to Ohlin until one examines Landgren's documentation. Land-
gren, no friend of dynamics, ascribes to Ohlin a rather un-Ohlinian
static-equilibrium determination of income and output. As Fernholm
[2] pointed out in his comprehensive review article, this is a
misrepresentation of Ohlin. To his theoretical misrepresentation
Landgren added a historical one, less gratifying to Ohlin: Ohlin
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must have seen the Keynesian light only after reading Keynes 5 March,
1933 letters to the London T i me
s
, assembled in the April, 1933 pam-
phlet The Means to Prosperity. Steiger [17], [18] has shown that
Ohlin's manuscript was completed In the fall of 1932, The debate
was rounded off by Lundberg's [10] balanced and elegant article
entitled, in English translation. "On Comprehending Keynes and
Understanding Others",
My Own Conelusion
In his 1933 article Ohlin applied two Keynesian tools of analysis,
i. e., (1) physical output as a variable and (2) the propensity to
save. In his 1934 book Ohlin's emphasis on physical output as a
variable became stronger and more explicit. In retrospect, Ohlin sees
nothing strange in this. In a letter to this writer of December
2, 1977 he writes, in English translation,
I am also happy that you emphasize so strongly that the
quantity of aggregate 'output and employment were variables
in my 1933-34 thinking. The wery assignment given by the
Unemployment Committee referred to the quantity of employ-
ment, and it would have been downright impossible not to
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consider the latter a variable and with it national income
1n terms of quantity side by side with the price level and
income in terms of value,
In his 1934 book Ohlin applied two additional Keynesian tools
of analysis, i. e., (3) liquidity preference and (4) the multiplier,
and finally a non-Keynesian one, i. e., (5) the accelerator.
Liquidity preference must have been discovered by Ohlin. Indeed,
glimpses of it are found even in his pre-1933 writings such as his
paper at the Scandinavian economists 5 1931 meeting [12] and his League
of Nations report [13] in the same year.
The accelerator and the multiplier were discovered by others,
but Ohlin's use of them shows how dynamic his macroeconomics was. The
accelerator is inherently dynamic and incompatible with a static equi-
librium, and Keynes never mentioned it. But if Keynes could do with-
out it, his followers could not. Lerner and Landgren notwithstanding,
"the economist has no choice but to study dynamics," as Samuelson
once put it. In the yery year of General Theory, Harrod [4] gave
the accelerator a prominent place In his Trade Cycle . Prompted
by Alvin Hansen, Samuelson [16] three years later dynamized the Keynes
ian system by his celebrated interaction between the multiplier and
the accelerator.
Unlike the accelerator, the multiplier is not inherently dyna-
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mic. A static multiplier may be formulated and was by Keynes.
As shown above, one may find the limit of my geometrical progression
for r[ approaching infinity. That limit is the static multiplier
1/(1 - c) used by Keynes [71, 115. For such a multiplier Ohlin had
no use. He never bothered to find the limit 1/(1 - c). His sense
of realism must have told him that public works don't last forever,
so n_ doesn*t go to infinity. Instead, Ohlin discussed speeds of
reaction at length.
Ohlin used his five tools to derive some strikingly Keynesian
policy conclusions. In times of underutilized capacity and unem-
ployment a government should not try to encourage a wage reduction
or a higher propensity to save. Instead, it should conduct
(1) A monetary policy of open-market operations designed to
depress the rate of Interest— subject to a liquidity-trap con-
straint and a balance-of-payments contraint,
(2) A policy of public works, generating income magnified by
the multiplier,
(3) A policy of——much less expensive subsidies to
private investment doing the same,
(4) A policy of raising tariffs, thus enlarging the multiplier
and easing the balance-of-payments constraint upon monetary poli-
cy.
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All this was 1n the 1934 book. Much of the necessary ana-
lytical apparatus was explicitly present in Ohlin*s 1933 article.
But not all. Was the rest of it implicit in that article trying
to get out of its cocoon and succeeding in doing so in 1934? Or
was the rest new and independent theory? We do not know, but what
matters is that by 1934 both Keynesian theory in a dynamic form
and Keynesian policy conclusions had been anticipated by Ohlin.
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FOOTNOTES
In Ch. 17 of General Theory [7], 222-229, Keynes did consider
"own rates" of interest like a wheat rate of interest, a copper
rate of interest, etc. end discussed their carrying-cost and
liquidity aspects. In Ch. 11 [7], 142-143 Keynes discussed
Fisher's [3] aspect of such "own-rates" but remained unconvinced.
o
On the committee, its findings, and its impact, see Uhr [20].
The Swedish word "sparbenagenhet" is composed of "spar [a]" £ to
save and "benagenhet". To neutralize my bias as an economist,
I consulted my Swedish-English dictionary and found three English
equivalents offered for the word "benlgenhet," i. e. disposition,
inclination, and propensity. The latter offering was exemplified
by "benagenhet for att ljuga" = propensity to lie, and "benagenhet
for dryckeaskap" = propensity to drink.
i. e., capital consumption allowances
5Ohlin uses the English words
Ohlin uses the English words
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From now on our review of Ohlin's 193A book will be very brief.
Our primary interest has been Ohlin's theoretical innovation, and
the remainder of the book specifies policy recommendations and is
well summarized by Uhr [20] s particularly 107-110.
Paul Samuelson encouraged me to do this section.
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